WASHINGTON — AS someone who has spent most of the past 25 years of his professional life in the United States government, think tanks and academia trying to stop the North Korean nuclear weapons program, I found last week’s nuclear test and the events that followed depressingly familiar. They reminded me of Captain Renault’s famous line from “Casablanca” just before he shuts down Rick’s Café: “I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!” The reactions to North Korea’s 2006, 2009 and 2013 nuclear tests were the same — shock. Yet a decade has gone by and the North Korean nuclear threat has only grown. (밝은 하늘: 난 핵무기가 미국이나 몇 개 나라에서만 보유해야 한다는 당신들 미국정부의 생각이 잘못되어도 엄청 잘못되었다고 생각한다. 실제로 과거 20세기부터 국제법을 무시하며 위반한 건 당신들 미국과 이스라엘이 아니던가? 메이저 언론에 소개가 잘 안 되었을 뿐이지...)
I probably shouldn’t say this, but I take my hat off to the North Koreans. They have played their cards extremely well. Despite this episodic outrage, they have managed to become a full-fledged small nuclear power with a growing and increasingly sophisticated arsenal. Moreover, even as they have moved down the nuclear path, they have maintained fairly normal political, economic and other relations with many countries from China to Ethiopia. In effect, a large number of countries have tacitly accepted North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. (take one's hat off to: ~에게 굴복하다) (full-fledged: 깃털이 다 난, 완전히 성장한, 자격을 갖춘) (arsenal: 무기)
How has the North been able to do this? There are, of course, wonky answers: Unilateral and multilateral sanctions haven’t been forceful enough, negotiators haven’t been tough enough. But a big reason you will not often hear is that Americans and the international community have a comic book image of North Korea. We simply don’t take them seriously. (wonky: 불안한, 정신 나간)
Their people are robots, sporting lapel-pin pictures of their Dear Leader and regularly attending mass rallies where thousands move in unison like the Radio City Rockettes. Their official media — hyperbolic pronouncements, constant threats and worshipful praise of the leader — magnifies a cultlike image. And most of all, their leaders look strange to us — for example, Kim Jong-il with his funny hairdo and dark glasses. Senator Ted Cruz typified this perception of the North recently, labeling the current leader, Kim Jong-un, as a “crazy nutcase” with a nuclear bomb. (unison: 일치, 조화) (move in unison: 일제히 움직이다)
I have been meeting with North Korean government officials for more than two decades in their country, Europe and Asia, and I can tell you that they are neither nutcases nor comic book characters. They are a diverse group, from hidebound apparatchiks to bureaucrats who teach themselves English by listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Some of them, military men especially, are hard-line, patriotic and, above all, anti-American. (nutcase: 미치광이) (hidebound apparatchiks: 완고한 기관원. 발음: 하이드바운드 애퍼라-칙)
I found that out firsthand in the 1990s, while leading a team on an inspection of a military-run underground facility that we thought might violate the 1994 United States-North Korea denuclearization agreement. My team was locked in a room surrounded by soldiers with bayonets drawn after one member of our team violated the inspection procedures. Many of us thought we were going to be killed. Eventually, we managed to extricate ourselves, but as we left the base in an old school bus, the military men followed us in a truck with a loudspeaker blaring anti-American slogans. I asked our North Korean civilian escort if they were going to follow us for the whole ride back to our hotel — two hours over bumpy roads. He responded with a smile: “Do you want them to?” (bayonets drawn: 총검을 찬) (bayonet: 총검: Fix/Unfix bayonets! 칼 꽂아(빼)!) (extricate: 곤란한 상황에서 빠져나오다, 탈출하다, 해방되다)
Americans might find it surprising that many North Korean officials take a nonideological view of foreign affairs. Indeed, we would call them realists. They are well aware of their national interests and are dedicated to safeguarding them, a dedication that is based on a keen understanding of the outside world. A case in point: At one meeting, I was sitting next to a well-connected North Korean official who wanted to talk about Hillary Clinton’s book “It Takes a Village.” (I was embarrassed to say I had not read it.) The North Koreans have demonstrated to me during many meetings that they are well versed in the particulars of political, economic and other developments in China, South Korea and Japan. (well-connected: 연줄이 좋은) (be well versed in: ~에 정통한) (밝은 하늘: 폐쇄적인 북한사회에서도 외부세계를 이해하려는 노력들이 있으며, 정통한 사람들이 있다는 사실을 보여주는 대목이다.)
It shouldn’t be surprising that North Koreans are realists. For decades, Americans thought Mao Zedong was an irrational, unstable dictator. But when the chips were down, he also turned out to be a serious realist by opening better relations with President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger after his relationship with Moscow deteriorated. In fact, I have been present several times when North Korean officials have met privately with Mr. Kissinger. They seemed to view those sessions as unprecedented opportunities to learn at the feet of an American statesman whom they deeply respect and admire.
Don’t get me wrong. The North Koreans may know a lot about the outside world, but they don’t know everything, even about the United States, their main adversary. In one meeting, an official asked, “Why do the president and secretary of state keep saying that the United States will not allow North Korea to have nuclear weapons when in fact you are not doing much to stop us?” He deduced that there must be a hidden agenda. “It’s because you want us to have nuclear weapons as an excuse to tighten your grip on South Korea and Japan, your two allies.” We responded that there was no hidden agenda and that the United States really did not want the North to have those weapons. I’m not sure we convinced him. (deduce: 추론, 연역하다) (밝은 하늘: 미국은 겉으론 아닌 척하면서 뒤에서 호박씨 까는 수법을 과거 여러 차례 여러 나라에서 보여주었다. 아니라고 할 것인가?)
What does all of this mean for America’s future policy toward North Korea? Immediate, strong responses to provocations are fine. So are public statements of indignation; bigger and better sanctions; more pressure on the North’s Chinese allies to support these measures; military steps to show the North Koreans and our allies that we are resolute. These are all warranted. But the North Koreans are in this for the long haul. They feel that their country and its government’s survival is at stake. Unless Americans take them seriously and formulate a long-term strategy for stopping this threat, rather than adopting ad hoc tactical responses, when North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test a few years from now, the United States will find itself, like Captain Renault in “Casablanca,” rounding up the usual suspects. (warrant: 체포영장, 보증, 장담, 타당하게 하다. 보증, 장담하다) (for the long haul: 긴 안목으로 보면, 결국엔) (be at stake: 위태롭다, 위태로운) (ad hoc: 즉석의, 즉각적인) (밝은 하늘: 이 문단이 글쓴이의 결론이다. 핵심은 제재나 군사적 조치 등과 같은 가시적 방법으로 북한의 도발을 억제할 수 있겠지만, 비가시적인 방법으로 북한주민들도 북한의 생존이 위험에 처해있다는 점을 진지하게 인식하면서 장기적인 계획을 세워서 대처하자는 것이다.)